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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impacts on future firm performance of a firm deciding to register 
from the outset of its operations. Until now, the assumption has been that starting up registered is linked 
to higher future firm performance. Reporting World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected in 
2014 on 9,281 formal enterprises in India, and controlling for other determinants of firm performance as 
well as the endogeneity of the registration decision, the finding is that formal enterprises that start up 
unregistered and spend longer unregistered have significantly higher subsequent annual sales and 
employment growth rates compared with those registered from the outset. When the number of years 
spent unregistered is included, there are also productivity gains from delaying registration. The tentative 
explanation is that in this weak institutional environment, the advantages of registering from the outset 
are outweighed by the benefits of deferring registration. Evaluating the policy implications, the argument 
is that there is a need to shift away from the conventional eradication approach toward unregistered 
startups based on the assumption they are unproductive, and toward a more facilitating approach that 
improves the benefits of being registered and tackles the systemic formal institutional deficiencies that 
lead entrepreneurs to delay their decision to register. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; informal sector; venture creation; firm performance; India. 
1.   Introduction 
Over the last few years, a new sub-discipline of the entrepreneurship literature has emerged 
that seeks understanding of entrepreneurship in the informal sector, by which is here meant 
starting-up and/or owning and managing an enterprise that is not declared to the authorities 
for tax, benefit and/or labor law purposes (Ketchen et al., 2014; Sharma, 2009; Siqueira et 
al., 2014; Williams and Nadin, 2010). This has begun to counter the conventional negative 
depictions of entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector (Williams, 2015c; Williams and 
Shahid, 2015; Williams et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). The aim of this paper is to further advance 
this re-representation of informal entrepreneurship by evaluating the relationship between 
firm registration and firm performance. Until now, informal sector entrepreneurship has been 
widely depicted negatively as poorly performing, unproductive endeavors, which is 
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deleterious to economic development and growth (Baumol, 1990; La Porta and Shleifer, 
2008, 2014). By revealing that formal enterprises that start up unregistered and spend longer 
unregistered witness higher subsequent levels of firm performance than enterprises that 
started up registered, the intention is to re-represent informal entrepreneurship in a more 
positive manner. To do this, we report WBES data on the relationship between informal 
entrepreneurship and firm performance in India, an influential emerging economy with an 
informal sector that absorbs about 85 percent of the working population (Sharma, 2012).  
In doing so, this paper advances scholarship on informal entrepreneurship in three 
important ways. Theoretically, it evaluates the association between being unregistered at 
start-up and firm performance. Until now, it has been widely assumed that informal 
entrepreneurs are unproductive. However, the hypothesis tested in this paper is that in weak 
institutional environments, there are few advantages of business registration and these are 
outweighed by the benefits of non-registration; meaning that starting up unregistered may 
well lead to higher subsequent firm performance than starting-up registered from the 
commencement of operations. Empirically, the important finding is that the widespread a 
priori assumption that starting up unregistered has a negative impact on firm performance is 
refuted. Sales, employment and productivity growth rates are revealed to be significantly 
higher in formal enterprises that started up unregistered than those registered from the outset 
in India. Third and finally, and from a policy perspective, it is revealed that rather than 
pursue the conventional eradication approach toward informal entrepreneurship based on the 
assumption that it is poorly performing endeavor, a more positive facilitating approach is 
required that focuses upon enhancing the benefits of business registration by tackling the 
systemic formal institutional deficiencies. 
To achieve this, section 2 outlines the scholarship on informal entrepreneurship and the 
shift toward a more positive representation of such entrepreneurial endeavor. Section 3 then 
focuses upon the relationship between informal entrepreneurship and firm performance by 
reviewing the conventional view of nonregistration as negatively affecting firm performance 
followed by some reasons for viewing nonregistration as enhancing subsequent firm 
performance. To evaluate the relationship between firm performance and starting up 
unregistered, section 4 introduces the data, namely WBES harmonized data on 9,281 
enterprises in India and the modelling framework used. Section 5 reports the results. Finding 
that formal enterprises that started up and spent longer unregistered have significantly higher 
subsequent annual sales, employment and productivity growth rates than those registered 
from the outset, section 6 discusses the implications for theory and policy along with the 
limitations of the study and further research needed.  
2.   Conceptualizations of Informal Entrepreneurship  
During the twentieth century, the widespread belief was that informal entrepreneurship was 
unimportant. This arose out of modernization theory, which saw the informal sector as part 
of an earlier production system and its persistence in countries as markers of their 
µXQGHUGHYHORSPHQW¶/HZLV, 1959; Geertz, 1963; Gilbert, 1998). The common view was that 
this informal sector was naturally and inevitably disappearing with economic advancement 
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and modernization. Nevertheless, in recent decades such an endeavor has been recognized as 
widespread and persistent (Schneider and Williams, 2013; ILO, 2013; Williams, 2015a,b). 
Indeed, the recognition that two-thirds of enterprises in developing countries start up 
unregistered (Autio and Fu, 2015) has resulted in the growth of scholarship on such 
entrepreneurship and new theorizations. 
First, and to update conventional modernization theory, La Porta and Shleifer (2008, 
2014) have recognized that the informal sector is extensive but nonetheless, still portray the 
formal and informal sectors as discrete and depict informal entrepreneurs negatively as 
uneducated populations operating micro-scale XQSURGXFWLYHHQWHUSULVHV LQ VHSDUDWH µERWWRP
RI WKH S\UDPLG¶ PDUNHWV where they produce low-quality products for impoverished 
consumers using little capital and adding little value. Second, a group of political economy 
scholars have recognized that the formal and informal sectors are not separate. Rather, 
informal entrepreneurship is portrayed as an inherent component of and direct by-product of 
a deregulated open world economy in which outsourcing and subcontracting have integrated 
informal enterprises into contemporary capitalism to reduce production costs (Castells and 
Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Meagher, 2010; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013). However, despite 
recognizing that informal entrepreneurship is inter-twined with the formal realm, such an 
endeavor has continued to be viewed as a negative phenomenon. 
These modernization and political economy theorizations, in consequence, view 
HFRQRPLHV DV ORVLQJ µQDWXUDO¶ FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV because of productive formal enterprises 
witnessing unfair competition from unproductive informal enterprises (Leal Ordóñez, 2014; 
Lewis, 2004), governments as losing regulatory control over work conditions (ILO, 2014) 
and tax revenue (Bajada and Schneider, 2005), and customers as receiving poorer quality 
products and services (Williams and Martinez, 2014b). Meanwhile, informal entrepreneurs 
are seen DV µnecessity-GULYHQ¶ &DVWHOOV DQG 3RUWHV, 1989), lacking access to capital, credit 
and financial services (ILO, 2014), and unproductive entrepreneurs ORFNHGLQDµSRYHUW\WUDS¶
(McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006).  
However, in more recent scholarship this negative representation has started to be 
questioned. Informal entrepreneurs operating labor-intensive enterprises have been argued to 
create jobs (Ketchen et al., 2014); the informal sector has started to be seen as a test-bed for 
entrepreneurial ventures (Barbour and Llanes, 2013; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 
2014a); formal enterprises as benefiting from cheaper sources of labor and raw materials 
(Ketchen et al., 2014); and informal entrepreneurs as benefiting from this escape route from 
corruption in the public sector and the regulatory burden in environments where this 
stifles venture growth (Tonoyan et al., 2010). Moreover, customers, particularly in 
µEDVH RI WKH S\UDPLG¶ PDUkets, are seen to benefit from more affordable products 
(Ketchen et al., 2014; London et al., 2014). 
This more positive view has arisen from the recognition that informal entrepreneurship is 
not universally necessity-driven and often a voluntary choice (Cross, 2000; Franck, 2012; 
Gërxhani, 2004; Maloney, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Williams, 2009; Williams and 
Gurtoo, 2012; Williams and Youssef, 2015). The result is the emergence of new theoretical 
SHUVSHFWLYHV )LUVW µOHJDOLVW¶ scholars have portrayed informal entrepreneurs as rational 
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economic actors who, after weighing up the costs of informality and benefits of formality, 
decide to operate in the informal sector. Therefore, informal entrepreneurship is argued to be 
more prevalent in developing than developed countries resulting from formalization having 
higher costs (e.g., time and effort to formally register, burdensome regulations) and fewer 
benefits (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Nwabuzor, 2005), which result in the costs of registration 
exceeding the benefits (Cross, 2000). 6HFRQGDQµLQVWLWXWLRQDO¶DSSURDFKKDVHPHUJHGZKLFK
views informal entrepreneurs as µVRFLDO DFWRUs¶ and informal entrepreneurship as occurring 
outside of formal institutional prescriptions but according to the norms, values and beliefs of 
informal institutions and thus, as socially legitimate endeavors (Kistruck et al., 2014; 
Siqueira et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2009). From this institutional perspective, informal 
entrepreneurship results from formal institutional imperfections, such as relatively weak 
legal and contract enforcement systems (Puffer et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2013), and/or 
³because of the incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by formal and informal 
institutions´ (Webb et al., 2009). If formal and informal institutions are in symmetry, 
informal entrepreneurship only occurs unintentionally (e.g., because of a lack of awareness 
of the rules and regulations). However, if formal and informal institutions are not aligned, 
informal entrepreneurship becomes rife (De Castro et al., 2014; Kistruck et al., 2015; 
Siqueira et al., 2014; Vu, 2014; Webb et al., 2013, 2014). As such, the greater the non-
alignment of formal and informal institutions, the greater is the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship (Williams and Horodnic, 2015; Williams and Shahid, 2015).  
3.   Informal Entrepreneurship and Firm Performance  
Despite more positive representations of informal entrepreneurship emerging, few if any 
studies have questioned the dominant view that unregistered enterprises witness weaker firm 
performance than registered enterprises (Farrell, 2004; ILO, 2007; Kundu and Lalitha, 1997; 
Palmer, 2008; Sharma, 2014). Indeed, the weaker performance thesis dominates across all 
theorizations. Modernization theory portrays informal enterprises as less efficient than 
IRUPDO HQWHUSULVHV RSHUDWLQJ LQ GLIIHUHQW µERWWRP RI WKH S\UDPLG¶ PDUNHWV DQG XQDEOH WR
charge lower prices for the same products (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008, 2014). Political 
economy theorists depict the informal sector as populated by necessity-driven, low-
productivity entrepreneurs using low levels of start-up capital and lacking the scale to 
produce efficiently, although the benefits gained by avoiding taxes and regulations offset 
their low productivity and small scale (Farrell, 2004; Palmer, 2008). This weaker 
performance thesis similarly prevails in both the rational economic actor and social actor 
explanations and a by-SURGXFW RI WKH V\VWHPLF IDLOXUH RI µZHDN¶ LQVWLWXWLRQV WR SURYLGH
sufficient benefits to warrant formalization (De Soto, 1989; Kistruck et al., 2014; Wunsch-
Vincent et al., 2015).  
To empirically support this consensus that informal entrepreneurship is poorer 
performing than formal entrepreneurship, scholars writing within all these theoretical 
perspectives normally cite the seminal study by La Porta and Shleifer (2008) who find that 
³Productivity is much higher in small formal firms than in informal firms, and it rises rapidly 
with the size of formal firms.´ To reach this conclusion, they analyze World Bank Informal 
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Surveys in thirteen countries and Micro-Enterprise Surveys in fourteen countries (nineteen in 
Africa, six in Asia and two in Latin America). The Informal Surveys on average comprised 
31 registered and 192 unregistered firms, and the Micro-Enterprise Surveys on average 
included 137 registered and 77 unregistered enterprises (i.e., a total sample of 2,321 
registered and 3,574 unregistered enterprises). In each country, the non-representative 
sampling strategy was that ³World Bank contractors identified neighborhoods perceived to 
have a large number of informal firms´ (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Arising out of this 
small unrepresentative sample, La Porta and Schleifer (2008) find that the variation in the 
performance of registered and unregistered enterprises is statistically significant in ten out of 
25 countries on value added per employee at the 0.1 level (and four countries at the 0.01 
level), seventeen out of 26 countries on sales per employee at the 0.1 level (and twelve at the 
0.01 level), and in eighteen out of 26 countries on output per employee at the 0.1 level 
(twelve at the 0.01 level). Therefore, significant variations in firm performance are not 
universal. More importantly, it was in fact unregistered enterprises that outperformed 
registered enterprises in six out of 25 countries on value added per employee, three out of 26 
countries on sales per employee and four out of 26 on output per employee (see La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2008: Tables 13 and 14). Indeed, in a little quoted footnote, they explicitly state that 
the overall productivity gap disappears and ³unregistered firms are not unusually 
unproductive once we take into account their expenditure on inputs, the human capital of 
their top managers, and their small size´ (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).  
In sum, there is weak evidence that unregistered enterprises have relatively weaker firm 
performance. Indeed, the other studies of this poorer performance thesis produce similarly 
weak evidence (Fajnzylber et al., 2009; Farrell, 2004; McKinsey Global Institute, 2003). For 
example, although Fajnzylber et al. (2009) assert that Mexican firms paying taxes display 
15-60 percent KLJKHU µSURGXFWLYLW\¶ OHYHOV WKH PHDVXUHRI SURGXFWLYLW\ LV SURILW OHYels and 
self-employment income and they fail to control for many of the firm-level determinants that 
influence firm performance.  
More importantly, it has been similarly assumed that formal enterprises that start up 
unregistered displayed weaker subsequent firm performance relative to those that registered 
from the outset of their operations. As La Porta and Shleifer (2008) state, ³the differences in 
productivity between formal and informal firms are so large that it is hard to believe that 
simply registering unregistered firms would eliminate the gap.´ However, the evidence is 
weak. The only study comparing the firm performance of formal enterprises starting up 
unregistered relative to those registered from the outset of operations, is a study of World 
Bank survey data on 355 unregistered startups in seven Latin American countries (104 in 
Colombia, 72 in Argentina, 72 in Bolivia, 66 in Mexico, twenty in Peru, twelve in Uruguay 
and nine in Panama). Perry et al. (2007) conclude that unregistered startups ³at least initially, 
exhibit on average, much lower levels of output per worker, after controlling for firm size, 
time in business, sector and region.´ Nevertheless, this is a small sample, the productivity 
gap is statistically significant in just four of the seven countries and the headline country 
average unregistered startups display 29 percent lower productivity is skewed by Peru where 
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only twenty unregistered startups were surveyed, and which has a 50 percent productivity 
gap that is not statistically significant.  
Given this consensus across all theories but weak evidence-base, we here evaluate this 
supposedly negative relationship between non-registration at start up and firm performance. 
Across the literature, formal enterprises starting up unregistered are thought to display 
weaker subsequent firm performance than enterprises registered from the outset. However, 
there are reasons for questioning this weaker performance thesis. Recognizing that many 
entrepreneurs operate unregistered out of choice (Gërxhani, 2004; Maloney, 2004; Perry and 
Maloney, 2007; Williams and Youssef, 2015), the opposite could be argued. Formal 
enterprises starting up unregistered may subsequently outperform enterprises registered from 
the outset because formal enterprises remaining unregistered during start-up avoid paying 
taxes, burdensome regulations and the additional costs imposed on formal enterprises by 
corrupt public sector officials for example. Therefore, they appear to possess many of the 
pre-requisites to outperform enterprises that witness these constraints from the outset of their 
venture. As La Porta and Shleifer (2014) state, formal firms have to pay taxes and comply 
with regulations, so they have a huge cost disadvantage relative to unregistered startups. 
Therefore, being initially unregistered may have positive influences on subsequent firm 
performance. Furthermore, if the benefits of formality are few, such as public goods 
provision by government and access to credit to expand existing establishments, then the 
registration costs may outweigh the benefits. Until now, few if any studies have evaluated 
this proposition that formal enterprises starting up unregistered witness better subsequent 
firm performance compared with those registered from the outset. To do so, the following 
proposition can be evaluated:  
Hypothesis 1. Controlling for key determinants of firm performance and the endogeneity of 
registration status, enterprises starting up unregistered and then registering display better 
levels of firm performance than those starting up registered.  
There are also similar competing views on whether and how the length of time a formal 
enterprise spent unregistered influences subsequent firm performance. The conventional 
view, based on the assumption that unregistered enterprises are poorer performing, is that the 
greater the length of non-registration, the worse will be the subsequent firm performance. 
Constrained from growing because of their limited access to credit and loans, and their need 
to stay small to avoid the authorities (Farrell, 2004; Palmer, 2008), the longer they stay 
unregistered, the poorer will be the performance of a formal enterprise relative to an 
enterprise registered from the outset.  
However, based on the proposition that starting up unregistered enhances subsequent 
firm performance, it might be asserted that the greater their duration of non-registration, the 
greater will be their advantage over firms registering at the outset. That is, the longer they do 
not suffer paying taxes, burdensome regulations and bribery from the public sector for 
instance, the more the advantages over those starting up registered are consolidated and the 
greater will be the differential in subsequent firm performance. This will be especially the 
case ZKHUHµZHDN¶IRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVprovide few benefits to formalization (Kistruck et al., 
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2014; Wunsch-Vincent et al., 2015) and thus, the costs of non-registration outweigh the 
benefits of registration (e.g., access to credit, opportunities to procure government contracts, 
outsource from large firms, access training and business support programs). Although in 
mature formal institutional environments, a tipping point may exist where the benefits of 
firm registration begin to outweigh the costs of non-registration; this is unlikely where there 
are weak formal institutions and there are fewer benefits of registration (De Mel et al., 2012; 
Thai and Turkina, 2014). As such, the following proposition can be tested: 
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for key determinants of firm performance and the endogeneity of 
registration status, the longer startups spend unregistered before registering, the higher is 
their performance. 
4.   Methods: Modeling Framework, Data and Variables 
4.1.   Modeling framework 
Whether enterprises register or not at the commencement of their operations can be viewed 
as an endogenous choice. Therefore, this sample of formal enterprises that either registered 
or not at the start of operations is not a random sample but rather, a sample with a systematic 
pattern of registration. If the determinants of firm performance and other relevant correlates 
are thus modeled without addressing the potential problem of sample selection bias, the 
estimates will not be reliable. Therefore, a Heckman two-step estimator (i.e., the Heckit 
estimator) is adopted here to produce the econometric estimates. Put simply, the indicators of 
firm performance in India are regressed on a number of determinants controlling for the 
problem of sample selection bias.   
Our primary equation (the equation of primary interest) that models the determinants of 
firm performance can be written as;  
iii xp 11
'
1
* HE     (4.1) 
where ix1 denotes a vector exogenous/control variable and 
*
ip UHSUHVHQWV ILUP ,¶V
performance (i.e., measured by sales, employment and productivity growth). The 
performance indicators are observed for formal firms that were both registered and 
unregistered at start up and spent different durations unregistered. When appropriate, 
equation (1) can be specified in terms of log of ( *ip ). 
To describe whether a firm is registered or not, a second equation (i.e. the selection 
equation) can be specified as;  
iii xR 22
'
2
* HE     (4.2) 
with the following observation rule; 
00&
0,1,
*
**
d 
!  
ii
iiii
RifR
RifRpp
   (4.3) 
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iR is a binary variable indicating the registration status, which assumes a value of 1 when a 
firm is registered at the start of operations and takes a value of 0 otherwise. Therefore, 
equation (2) can be estimated using a standard probit model, which is appropriate to predict 
the probability of registration based on a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation technique. 
This constitutes the first stage of estimation. The second stage of estimation is conducted 
using equation (1) after including the selectivity correction term generated at the first probit 
stage of the estimation. The specification is completed by making a distributional assumption 
on the error terms of the primary and selection equations. We assume that i1H and i2H follow 
a bivariate normal distribution with expectations zero and constant variances given as 21V  
and 22V respectively. The covariance of the errors is given as 12V . After controlling for self-
selection, the second stage regressions enable us to test the two hypotheses.  
4.2.   Data 
The WBES collects data using a stratified random sample of non-agricultural formal private 
sector businesses with five or more employees, which is stratified by firm size, business 
sector and geographic region. The firm size strata in the WBES are 5-19 (small) 20-99 
(medium), and 100+ employees (large-sized firms), while sector is broken down into 
manufacturing, services, transportation and construction. Public utilities, government 
services, health care and financial services sectors are not included. Geographical regions 
within the country are selected based on which cities/regions collectively contain the 
majority of economic activity. The sampling frame is derived from the universe of eligible 
ILUPVQRUPDOO\REWDLQHGIURPWKHFRXQWU\¶VVWDWLVWLFDORIILFHRUDQRWKHUJRYHUQPHQWDJHQF\
such as the tax or business licensing authorities. To collect data, a harmonized questionnaire 
is used to obtain responses from business owners and top managers in 9,281 firms in India 
that were interviewed from June 2013 through December 2014. Although 135 countries are 
covered by the WBES and data is available from 2002 to 2014, the observed sample here is 
restricted to India, which has WBES data collected in 2014. 
4.3.   Variables 
4.3.1.   Dependent variables 
There are three key firm performance measures which serve here as the dependent variables 
and are expressed in terms of logs, namely: (1) real annual sales growth (using GDP 
deflators) (%). All values for sales are converted to USD using the exchange rate in the 
corresponding fiscal year of the survey. Sales are deflated to 2009 using the USD deflator; 
(2) annual employment growth (%) computed as the change in full-time employment 
reported in the current fiscal year from a previous period. And (3) annual productivity 
growth (%); this is a derived variable that measures annualized growth in labor productivity 
where labor productivity is real sales (using GDP deflators) divided by full-time permanent 
workers. Annual productivity growth is the change in labor productivity reported in the 
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current fiscal year from a previous period. For India, the difference is two years. Therefore, 
an annualized measure is used here.  
4.3.2.   Key independent variables 
To evaluate the influence of registration at startup on future firm performance, two indicators 
are used: (1) started unregistered,²a firm-level measure that examines responses to the 
TXHVWLRQ µ:DV WKLVHVWDEOLVKPHQW IRUPDOO\ UHJLVWHUHGZKHQ LWEHJDQRSHUDWLRQV"¶7KLV LVD
dummy variable with a value of 1 indicating the firm started operations in the country 
without formal registration and 0 when the firm was formally registered, and (2) years 
unregistered²a continuous variable counting the number of years the firm operated without 
formal registration. This variable has value 0 for those firms registered since startup. It is 
FRPSXWHGE\DQDO\]LQJWKHUHVSRQVHVWRWKUHHTXHVWLRQVµ,QZKDW\HDUGLGWKLVHVWDEOLVKPHQW
EHJLQRSHUDWLRQV"¶ µ:DV WKLVHVWDEOLVKPHQW IRUPDOO\UHJLVWHUHGZKHQ LWEHJDQRSHUDWLRQV"¶
DQGµ,QZKDW\HDUZDVWKLVHVWDEOLVKPHQWIRUPDOO\UHJLVWHUHG"¶ The average number of years 
formal firms operated without registration is computed only for firms stating they were not 
formally registered when they started operations.  
4.3.3.   Control variables 
To measure whether formal enterprises that started up and spent varying amounts of time 
unregistered witness different levels of firm performance than enterprises registered from the 
outset, it is necessary to control for other key determinants of firm performance. Since the 
HDUO\¶VWKHUHDUHDJURZLQJQXPEHURIVWXGLHVRIWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIILUPSHUIRUPDQFH
in India with varying results and focus on key performance correlates such as the importance 
of business location for sales growth, emphasizing the need to focus on economic geography 
considerations (Sharma, 2014, 2009; Mukim, 2011; Kundu and Lalita, 1997). Here, a range 
of characteristics are examined, which previous studies reveal to significantly influence firm 
performance, namely firm size, legal status and ownership structure, export orientation, 
sector, access to finance, the level of technological innovation, human capital factors and 
other business environment factors. 
Firm size determines firm performance, with larger firms performing better than smaller 
ones (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Firm size is a categorical variable with the value of 1 for 
small firms with less than twenty employees, value of 2 for medium sized firms between 
twenty and 99 employees, and value of 3 for large firms with more than 100 employees. 
Different types of ownership structure and legal status are strongly correlated with firm 
performance, including whether a firm is state- or privately-owned, foreign- or domestic-
owned and an open- or closed-shareholding, partnership or sole proprietorship 
(Baghdasaryan and la Cour, 2013; Barbera and Moores, 2013). This is important to control 
for because unregistered startups often have different ownership structures and legal statuses 
than those registered at start-up. Legal status is a categorical variable indicating whether an 
enterprise is an open or closed shareholding, a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited 
partnership, or some other form. Whether the enterprise is foreign- or domestic-owned is 
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also analyzed using a dummy variable with the value of 1, indicating if the share of the 
ILUP¶VRZQHUVKLSKHOGE\IRUHLJQ LQGLYLGXDOVRUHQWHUSULVHV LV ODUJHU WKDQ percent and 0 
otherwise. Given how export-oriented firms display higher firm performance (La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2008), export-orientation is controlled for using a dummy variable with the value of 
1, indicating that firms export at least one percent of sales and 0 for those who do not. 
Firm performance also varies across sectors (Nabar and Yan, 2013; Siqueira et al., 2014). 
Given how unregistered startups are concentrated in labor-intensive sectors with fewer 
returns to scale (Perry et al., 2007), controlling for this is important. Sector is a categorical 
variable indicating the sector of the firm. Access to finance and firm performance are also 
strongly correlated. Given how unregistered startups lack access to formal finance, this may 
influence subsequent firm performance because they scale-down operations and the high cost 
of informal loans result in them substituting (low skilled) labor for physical capital (Amaral 
and Quintin, 2006; Cull et al., 2007). Here, access to credit is a dummy variable with the 
value of 1, indicating the firm has access to bank loans or to a line of credit and 0 otherwise. 
Firm performance is also related to the level of technological innovation (Mansury and 
Love, 2008). Informal enterprises display less innovation and adoption of new technologies 
and that which does occur is more adaptation and imitation (Grimm et al., 2012; Kabecha, 
1998; Wunsch-Vincent et al., 2015), and for some this is the primary reason for the 
productivity gap between developed and developing economies (Farrell, 2004; Palmade, 
2005). Here, three basic control variables are used: quality certification, a dummy variable 
with the value of 1, indicating the enterprise has an internationally-recognized certification 
and 0 otherwise; presence of a website, a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the 
enterprise uses a website for business and 0 otherwise, and the use of e-mail, a dummy 
variable with the value of 1 when an enterprise uses e-mail with suppliers and clients, and 0 
otherwise.  
Human capital significantly impacts on firm performance (Black and Lynch, 1996; 
Gennaiolo et al., 2013; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; Van der Sluis et al., 2005). Therefore, 
controlling for this is important, particularly given that informality is associated with less 
productive workers (Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Dimova et al., 2008). Here, six control 
YDULDEOHV DUH XVHG WRS PDQDJHU¶V H[SHULHQFH D FRQWLQXRXV YDULDEOH RI WKH \HDUV of 
experience of the top manager in the sector; temporary workers, a variable of the average 
number of temporary workers in the firm; permanent full-time workers, a continuous 
variable of the average number of permanent full-time workers in the firm; female full-time 
workers; and as an indicator of professionalism, whether they use an external auditor, a 
dummy variable with the value of 1, indicating its annual financial statement is reviewed by 
an external auditor and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, the wider business environment determines firm performance. Two control 
variables measuring various facets of the business environment and whether they are a major 
constraint on the enterprise are used, namely: transport, a dummy variable with the value of 
1, indicating that transportation is a major constraint on activity and 0 otherwise, and 
electricity, a dummy variable with the value of 1, indicating that electricity supply is a major 
constraint on activity and 0 otherwise. 
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5.   Findings 
Of the 9,281 formal enterprises with five or more employees surveyed in India, 12.5 percent 
started up unregistered and on average remained unregistered for 1.3 years before 
registering. Among other developing economies in the WBES database, India has the most 
firms unregistered at start-up, pointing to the relative importance of the informal sector in 
India compared with elsewhere. The basic descriptive results of firm performance are that 
formal enterprises unregistered at the commencement of operations subsequently had 38 
percent higher annual sales growth than those registered from the outset (8.7% compared 
with 6.3%), 12 percent higher annual employment growth (5.6% compared with 5.0%), and 
95 percent higher annual productivity growth rate (3.7% compared with 1.9%). Although 
these descriptive statistics appear to display the benefits that being unregistered at start-up, 
these figures do not control for other determinants of firm performance.  
To explore the interrelationships among our dependent and independent variables 
analytically using a regression set up between informal entrepreneurship and firm 
performance, we estimated a Heckman regression model, which enables us to handle the 
potential endogeneity discussed in the methodology (i.e., the endogenous choice of 
registration status by firms). Table 1 reveals that for these formal enterprises with five or 
more employees, starting up unregistered is positively and significantly associated with 
higher subsequent sales, employment and productivity growth rates (although there is a 
negative and significant association with productivity when we control only for registration 
status). Annual sales growth is 9.2 percent higher for those formal enterprises starting up 
unregistered compared with those registered from the outset (7.1% compared with 6.5%), 
and annual employment growth is 37.3 percent higher (6.7% compared with 4.9%). 
Although annual productivity growth is 0.05 percentage points higher in firms registered 
from the outset, this is not the case when we control for years unregistered. Therefore, these 
regression results overall are consistent with the descriptive bivariate relationships. Hence, 
hypothesis 1 is confirmed for annual sales and employment growth. This sits in contrast to a 
previous finding in India based on a smaller and older dataset, which supports the view that 
registration leads to better firm performance (Sharma, 2014). Our estimation set up takes the 
joint estimation of the registration status (first-stage) and the performance indicator (second-
stage) equations in the framework of Heckman two-step estimator.   
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Table 1. Impacts of starting up unregistered on firm performance: Heckman selection model 
Variable  Sales Growth Employment 
Growth  
Productivity Growth 
Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant  -3.22***(0.57) 1.54***(0.29) -4.79***(0.62) 
Unregistered  0.59***(0.26) 1.83***(0.14) -1.21***(0.29) 
Firm age -0.08***(0.01) -0.09***(0.01) -0.01(0.01) 
Exporter -0.63***(0.23) -0.31***(0.12) -0.36(0.25) 
Foreign ownership 3.87***(0.75) 2.85**(0.39) 1.07(0.83) 
Workforce    
Top manager years of experience 0.03***(0.01) -0.03***(0.00) 0.06***(0.01) 
Temporary workers 0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
Permanent fulltime workers 0.01***(0.00) 0.01***(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
Female ownership % 0.39*(0.23) 0.01(0.12) 0.42*(0.25) 
Credit access  0.97***(0.17) 0.79***(0.09) 0.21(0.19) 
Major constraints    
Transport constraint -0.31(0.23) -1.09***(0.11) 0.79***(0.24) 
Electricity constraint 0.04(0.17) -0.36***(0.01) 0.41**(0.18) 
Innovation     
Quality certification  -0.24(0.17) 0.00(0.08) -0.23(0.18) 
External auditor  -0.39**(0.18) 1.12***(0.09) -1.55***(0.19) 
Website 0.91***(0.17) -0.82***(0.09) 1.64***(0.19) 
E-mail  0.59***(0.22) 0.28***(0.11) 0.38*(0.24) 
Firm size (RC: small)    
Medium  0.78***(0.17) 1.56**(0.09) -0.72***(0.19) 
Large  0.40(0.26) 1.55***(0.13) -1.13***(0.28) 
Legal status (RC: other)    
Open shareholding -4.30***(0.67) 2.23***(0.35) -6.53***(0.74) 
Closed shareholding -1.23**(0.54) 2.65***(0.28) -3.75***(0.59) 
Sole partnership -1.49***(0.50) 2.75***(0.26) -4.08***(0.55) 
Partnership  -1.73***(0.51) 1.72***(0.26) -3.36***(0.56) 
Limited partnership -3.50***(0.51) 1.03***(0.27) -4.45***(0.56) 
Rho 0.01(0.06) 0.04(0.07) -0.00(0.06) 
Lambda  0.13(1.06) 0.33(0.66) -0.06(1.11) 
Wald Chi-square statistic (p-
value) 
497.9*** 
(0.00) 
2321.3*** 
(0.00) 
354.1*** 
(0.00) 
No of observations  9281 9281 9281 
***,**, *= statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
Meanwhile, Table 2 examines whether the length of time these formal enterprises spent 
unregistered influences their firm performance. The finding is that when we control for other 
key determinants of firm performance and the endogenous choice of registration status, 
enterprises spending longer unregistered display significantly higher annual levels of sales, 
employment and productivity growth rates. For each extra year of nonregistration, annual 
sales growth is 0.6 percentage points higher, annual employment growth is 1.83 percentage 
points higher and annual productivity growth is 0.1 percentage points higher, all of which are 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 is therefore confirmed. 
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Table 2. Impact of years spent unregistered on firm performance: Heckman selection model 
Variable  Sales Growth  Employment Growth Productivity Growth 
Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant  -2.50***(0.57) 1.89***(0.30) -5.06***(0.61) 
Years Unregistered  0.12***(0.03) 0.09***(0.01) 0.05*(0.02) 
Firm age -0.16***(0.02) -0.08***(0.01) -0.02**(0.01) 
Exporter -0.58***(0.23) -0.30***(0.12) -0.36(0.25) 
Foreign ownership 3.79***(0.75) -2.89***(0.38) 1.01(0.83) 
Workforce    
Top manager years of 
experience 
0.04***(0.01) -0.03***(0.00) 0.07***(0.01) 
Temporary workers 0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
Permanent workers 0.01***(0.00) 0.01***(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
Female ownership % 0.37*(0.22) -0.01(0.12) 0.43*(0.24) 
Credit access  0.97***(0.17) 0.79***(0.10) 0.22(0.19) 
Major constraints    
Transport constraint -0.31(0.23) -1.11***(0.12) 0.82***(0.25) 
Electricity constraint -0.02(0.16) -0.38***(0.09) 0.38**(0.18) 
Innovation    
Quality certification -0.21(0.16) -0.09(0.08) -0.14(0.18) 
External auditor  -0.43**(0.18) 0.92**(0.09) -1.37***(0.19) 
Website 0.87***(0.17) -0.80***(0.09) 1.60***(0.19) 
E-mail  0.64***(0.22) -0.19*(0.11) 0.47**(0.24) 
Firm size (RC: small)    
Medium  0.84***(0.17) 1.64***(0.08) -0.78***(0.19) 
Large  0.43*(0.25) 1.63***(0.13) -1.17***(0.28) 
Legal status (RC: Other)    
Open shareholding -4.34***(0.68) 2.16***(0.35) -6.47***(0.74) 
Closed shareholding -1.26**(0.54) 2.57***(0.28) -3.70***(0.59) 
Sole  partnership -1.43**(0.50) 2.76***(0.26) -4.11***(0.54) 
Partnership  -1.72***(0.51) 1.64***(0.26) -3.31***(0.56) 
Limited partnership -3.49***(0.51) 0.95***(0.25) -4.40***(0.55) 
Rho 0.01(0.05) 0.04(0.06) -0.00(0.06) 
Lambda  0.08(0.84) 0.33(0.66) -0.08(1.11) 
Wald Chi-square statistic 
(p-value) 
555.0*** 
(0.00) 
942.7***  
(0.00) 
338.3*** 
(0.00) 
No of observations  9281 9281 9281 
***,**, *= statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
Moreover, the observation that there are no differences between Tables 1 and 2 in terms 
of the sign and statistical significance of all the other additional explanatory variables 
displays that our results are robust. Whether we use the dummy/binary variable indicating 
registration status as a regressor, or the number of years spent unregistered before 
registration (which is a continuous variable), the key findings do not change. As indicated by 
the rho, lambda parameters and also a likelihood ratio (LR) test for the independence of 
equations, standard OLS are used to check robustness further by estimating particularly those 
equations pertaining to employment and productivity growth where the selectivity bias 
problem is less severe and the dependence between the selection and the primary equation is 
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limiteda. All the specified models reported in Tables 1 and 2 have strong explanatory power 
of the variation of all the three firm performance indicators as shown by the diagnostics. This 
is evident from the large Wald chi-square statistic and its associated p-value which is 
statistically significant.  
6.   Discussion and Conclusions 
This analysis of WBES data reveals that in India, 12.5 percent of the formal private sector 
businesses with five employees or more surveyed had started up unregistered and of these, 
the average length of time they spent unregistered was one year and three months. For these 
formal enterprises, starting up unregistered is positively and significantly associated with 
higher subsequent sales, employment and productivity growth rates, but is negatively and 
significantly associated with lower productivity growth rates if we control only for 
registration status, but significantly associated if we include years of non-registration. 
Moreover, the longer they spend unregistered, the significantly higher is their sales, 
employment and productivity growth rates. Therefore, overall evidence is found to support 
hypothesis 1 in both sales and employment growth rates, but not productivity growth rates, 
while evidence is found to confirm hypothesis 2 that the length of nonregistration improves 
firm performance in terms of all performance indicators (i.e., annual sales, employment and 
productivity growth rates).  
These findings in India have important wider implications for theory. They clearly 
display the need to transcend the theoretical perspectives that adopt a negative depiction of 
informal entrepreneurship. Formal enterprises in India that were unregistered at start-up, and 
those that remain unregistered for longer, do not witness worse subsequent firm performance 
than those that registered at the outset of their operations. Rather, and reinforcing more 
positive theoretical perspectives toward informal entrepreneurship, non-registration at the 
outset provides a significant boost to subsequent annual sales and employment growth rates, 
and the longer that they remained unregistered, the higher are their annual sales, employment 
and productivity growth rates. Theoretically, this strongly intimates that because of the 
meagre benefits of registration in India, the benefits of starting up unregistered outweigh the 
benefits of registering at the outset. Put another way, the deficiencies of the formal 
institutional environment in providing benefits for formal enterprises play a key role in 
determining the existence of informal entrepreneurship.  
This has important implications for policy. For many years, based on a negative portrayal 
of informal entrepreneurship as worse performing, the conventional policy approach has 
been to pursue the eradication of informal enterprises. Based on the Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) rational economic actor approach that seeks to change the costs of operating 
unregistered and benefits of operating formally, governments predominantly sought to 
increase the costs of operating unregistered by increasing the penalties. The findings in this 
paper intimate that there is also a need to decrease the costs and increase the benefits of 
                                                          
a
 These results can be provided upon request.  
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registration. This is because the benefits seem to be currently insufficient to outweigh the 
benefits of nonregistration at start-up in India, manifested in the poorer subsequent firm 
performance. This will require measures to reduce the costs of registration, such as 
simplifying the registration process and an improvement in the benefits that result from 
registration (Maloney, 2004; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006). 
This requires that that the systemic formal institutional deficiencies need to be addressed 
that lead entrepreneurs to make the decision to start up unregistered. In recent years, 
recognition has emerged, grounded in institutional theory, that informal entrepreneurs are 
also often social actors (De Castro et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014; Williams and 
Shahid, 2015). Based on this recognition that non-registration DULVHV ZKHQ HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶
norms, values and beliefs are not in symmetry with the prescriptions of formal institutions, 
there is a need to tackle the formal institutional imperfections that provide little incentive for 
entrepreneurs to register and adhere to the laws and regulations of the formal institutional 
environment. These alterations in formal institutions are of two types. First, procedural and 
redistributive justice and fairness needs to be improved. Fairness here refers to whether 
entrepreneurs believe they pay a fair share compared with others (Wenzel, 2004), 
redistributive justice to whether they feel that they receive the goods and services they 
deserve given the taxes they pay (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001) and procedural justice to 
whether they believe that the authorities treat them in a respectful, impartial and responsible 
manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2000; Murphy, 2005). Second, it necessitates greater 
social protection, less public sector corruption and more effective social transfer 
mechanisms, all of which are strongly correlated with higher registration levels and greater 
formality (Autio and Fu, 2015; Dau and Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2014; Klapper et al., 2007; Thai 
and Turkina, 2014). 
Nevertheless, there are limitations to this study. Only one country has been analyzed and 
this paper reveals only that formal enterprises with five more employees who started up 
unregistered witness higher subsequent sales, employment and productivity growth rates 
than those that registered from the outset. Therefore, we can assert only that those formal 
enterprises that started unregistered outperform those registered from the outset; we cannot 
argue that unregistered enterprises as a whole outperform registered enterprises. 
Nevertheless, some very tentative clues exist that should be investigated in future research. 
Similar to formal enterprises that delay registration, they operate under the same conditions 
that boost firm performance, including being able to avoid taxes, burdensome regulations 
and corrupt public sector officials. Consequently, future research could investigate the firm 
performance of unregistered compared with registered enterprises, especially given the 
current weak evidence to support the poorer performance thesis of unregistered enterprises 
(e.g., La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). A further limitation is that this study does not reveal 
whether the reasons for being unregistered (e.g., whether they are simply awaiting 
registration, deliberately testing WKH YHQWXUH¶V YLDELOLW\ EHIRUH UHJLVWHULQJ RU KDYH QR
intention of registering) or the reasons they register (e.g., access to finance, fewer bribes, 
greater opportunities with formal firms, access to government contracts), influence 
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subsequent firm performance. Future research will need to investigate this, not least to tailor 
policy measures.  
In conclusion, formal enterprises that delayed registration have been revealed to 
outperform those registered from the commencement of operations in India. This calls into 
question the long-standing depiction of informal entrepreneurship as poorer performing. If 
this now stimulates similar research in other countries and global regions, then one intention 
will have been fulfilled. If this also results in a questioning of the policy approaches pursued 
toward informal entrepreneurship, this paper will have achieved its fuller intention. What is 
certainly the case is that the dominant negative representation of informal entrepreneurship 
as poorer performing cannot be taken for granted without providing an evidence-base to 
support such an assertion.  
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